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Leave It on the Field 
TOO EXPANSIVE AN APPROACH TO EVALUATING 
TITLE IX COMPLIANCE IN BIEDIGER V. 
QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a woman who is a first-year student at a 
university. She loves playing softball and enjoyed four years on 
her high school varsity team, but she was not recruited to play 
in college and is unsure whether her skill level will enable her 
to make it onto her university’s team. When she sees the 
announcement for walk-on tryouts posted in the gym, she 
shows up determined to give it her best shot. Although her skill 
level is not up to the standard of the majority of the women 
present at the tryout, she is pleased to learn that she is being 
offered a spot on the team. However, the coach tells her that 
she will only be able to practice with the team, cannot travel 
with the team to away games, and will not be provided with a 
uniform. Other candidates reject offers to join the practice 
squad under these conditions, but she happily accepts. She 
enjoys the camaraderie of a team atmosphere, loves the sport, 
and finds practices to be an excellent way to keep fit. Although 
the coach is unable to devote as much attention to her as to the 
women on the competition roster, the woman is satisfied with 
her experience and remains on the practice squad throughout 
the season. She is told that next year she has a good shot at 
making it onto the competition roster. Now imagine a court of 
law deciding that this woman does not count towards the 
university’s number of female athletes for purposes of Title IX 
because her athletic participation is not “meaningful.” Imagine 
the court deciding that this woman does not count because her 
participation is merely the product of a “false roster floor.” 
Should the court be entitled to determine whether her 
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experience is meaningful? Doesn’t the fact that the woman 
decided to accept the offer and remain on the team throughout 
the season indicate that her participation was meaningful?  
According to the legislation’s primary sponsor, Senator 
Birch Bayh, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 was 
enacted to provide for the women of America something that is 
rightfully theirs: an equal chance to attend the schools of their 
choice, to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills 
with the knowledge that they will have a fair chance to secure 
the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal work.2 
It is doubtful that, at the time of its enactment, Senator 
Bayh foresaw the enormous implications that this statute 
would have on collegiate athletics or the many hurdles that 
would arise from enforcing Title IX in that area. However, the 
hurdles have been countless, and new questions continue to 
arise regarding the avenues of compliance.3 The Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education is the agency 
tasked with the enforcement of Title IX.4 The OCR has issued 
numerous regulations to guide educational institutions’ 
compliance efforts in the area of athletics.5 Most basically, the 
OCR has determined that Title IX requires schools that receive 
federal funding to provide “equal athletic opportunities for 
members of both sexes,” which relies in part on “whether the 
selection of sports and levels of competition effectively 
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both 
sexes.”6 In 1979, the OCR provided that a school would be 
entitled to the presumption of Title IX compliance if 
“intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and 
female students are provided in numbers substantially 
proportionate to their respective enrollments.”7 This 
“substantial proportionality” standard, the primary focus of 
this note, is contained in the first prong of the OCR Policy 
Interpretation’s three-part test.8 
  
 1 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).  
 2 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972). 
 3  See, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 
2010); Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 4 See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 
(D.C. Cir. 2004).  
 5 See id. at 934-35. 
 6 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994).  
 7 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).  
 8 Id. 
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In 2009, members and the coach of the women’s 
volleyball team at Quinnipiac University were granted a 
preliminary injunction against Quinnipiac when the District 
Court for the District of Connecticut, in the case of Biediger v. 
Quinnipiac University, determined that the plaintiffs were likely 
to succeed on the merits of their claim that the university’s 
athletics department failed to comply with Title IX.9 Quinnipiac 
maintained that the plan its athletic department intended to 
implement for the 2009-2010 school year would bring it into 
compliance under the “substantial proportionality” standard 
contained in first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-
part test.10 Specifically, Quinnipiac anticipated that it would 
provide athletic participation opportunities to both sexes in 
numbers substantially proportional to their representation in 
the student body for the 2009-2010 school year.11 The Biediger 
court, however, questioned whether the athletic participation 
opportunities for women that Quinnipiac relied upon were 
sufficiently “meaningful” to be counted.12 When a roster spot 
reserved for a woman goes unfilled (i.e., no woman actually 
participates), the participation opportunity is unquestionably 
not meaningful.13 However, the Biediger court went further to 
suggest that even a roster spot that is filled might not be 
counted if the experience of the participant in that spot is not of 
a certain quality.14 The court was particularly concerned with 
Quinnipiac’s practice of setting roster floors—allocating a 
certain amount of roster spots for women’s teams and requiring 
coaches to carry no fewer than that amount of athletes.15 While 
the court did not go so far as to explicitly reject roster floors as a 
valid means of achieving Title IX compliance, it made a 
suggestion to that effect.16 
This note will examine the reasoning and implications 
of the Biediger decision and make an argument that, regardless 
of the outcome on the merits, the court’s reasoning represents a 
potentially worrisome trend. First, this note will argue that in 
fashioning remedies, courts should carefully balance the public 
  
 9 Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 10 Id. at 281. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 295. 
 13 Id. at 297. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 296. 
 16 Id. 
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interest of enforcing Title IX with the interest of providing 
educational institutions autonomy to make their own spending 
decisions. Secondly, it will argue that the court in Biediger v. 
Quinnipiac University erred in taking an unprecedented 
subjective17 approach to evaluating Quinnipiac’s compliance 
under the “substantial proportionality” standard of the OCR 
Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. Specifically, the court 
should not have expanded its analysis to include a 
determination of whether the participation of female athletes 
was sufficiently “meaningful.” Finally, this note will argue that 
the use of roster floors by universities should be a permissible 
means of complying with Title IX.  
Part II will review the background of Title IX and, in 
particular, the OCR regulations issued to guide institutions in their 
compliance efforts in the area of collegiate athletics. Part III will 
examine the “substantial proportionality” standard of the OCR 
Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. Additionally, the Part will 
discuss the facts and reasoning of the court in Biediger v. 
Quinnipiac University, and will compare that case to one of its 
predecessor cases, Choike v. Slippery Rock University. Finally, Part 
III will discuss the implications of the court’s decision in Biediger, 
specifically as they pertain to the use of roster management policies 
and to the court’s departure from treating the first prong of the 
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test as an almost purely 
objective standard.  
Part IV will suggest an approach for the future for 
evaluating compliance based on the “substantial proportionality” 
standard. First, the Part will argue that courts must perform a 
balancing act in order to best resolve the prevalent conflict between 
the interests of schools in making spending decisions with regard 
to their own athletic programs and the public’s interest in enforcing 
Title IX. Additionally, it will argue that the “substantial 
proportionality” prong should remain a largely objective standard 
and that the Biediger court improperly expanded the scope of its 
analysis to include a highly subjective element. Finally, it will 
argue that roster floors, while admittedly imperfect, should be a 
permissible means for schools to comply with Title IX because of 
the important benefits they offer.  
  
 17 For purposes of this note, a “subjective” approach with respect to the 
“substantial proportionality” standard refers to a court’s willingness to examine an 
athletic participant’s personal experience on a sports team, whereas an “objective” 
approach refers to a strictly number-based application of the standard. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX: GOALS, REQUIREMENTS, AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197218 was 
enacted by Congress in response to an observed pattern of 
manifest and abundant discrimination against women in the 
educational arena, and was designed to prohibit 
“discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded 
educational programs and activities.”19 As directed by Congress, 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the 
predecessor agency to the Department of Education, issued 
regulations in 1975 implementing Title IX in the area of 
intercollegiate athletics.20 These regulations require that 
recipients of federal funding provide “equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes,” compliance with which 
is determined by examining ten non-exhaustive factors, the 
first being “whether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities 
of members of both sexes.”21 In 1979, the Office of Civil Rights 
of the HEW issued a Policy Interpretation to clarify the Title IX 
regulatory requirements.22 Specifically, it set out three areas to 
guide educational institutions in their compliance efforts: (1) 
equal athletic financial assistance; (2) equal treatment and 
benefits for athletic teams; and (3) effective accommodation of 
student interests and abilities.23  
With regard to the third of these areas, the OCR Policy 
Interpretation included a three-part test defining what 
constitutes “effective accommodation” of “the interests and 
  
 18 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006). 
 19 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). The act states, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except 
that . . . .” and lays out nine standard exceptions. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. 
 20 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994). 
 21 Id. The other nine factors are as follows:  
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and 
practice time; (4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive 
coaching and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches 
and tutors; (7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; (9) Provision of 
housing and dining facilities and services; (10) Publicity. 
Id. 
 22 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
 23 Id. at 71,414. 
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abilities of both sexes.”24 The first part, which is the focus of 
this note, is “[w]hether intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are provided in 
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments.”25 In 1980, the responsibility of Title IX 
implementation fell to the newly created United States 
Department of Education, and the 1975 regulations were re-
codified but remained essentially the same.26 In 1996, the OCR 
of the Department of Education issued a “Clarification 
Memorandum” on the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part 
test, accompanied by a “Dear Colleague” letter to interested 
parties,27 which confirmed that an institution could comply with 
the test by satisfying any one of the three prongs, and that the 
three-part test “is only one of many factors that the 
Department examines to assess an institution’s overall 
compliance with Title IX and the 1975 Regulations.”28  
Despite these early efforts to clearly explicate an 
educational institution’s Title IX responsibilities with regard to 
athletics, shortly after the enactment of Title IX, a fundamental 
  
 24 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 935; 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. 
 25 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. The second part of the test is “Where the members 
of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether 
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which 
is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of 
that sex,” and the third part is: 
Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate 
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program 
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the 
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and 
effectively accommodated by the present program. 
Id. 
 26 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 934.  
 27 “Dear Colleague” letters are official correspondence generally distributed 
in bulk by one or more members of Congress to “colleagues of a Member, committees, 
officers of the two chambers, and congressional staff organizations” with the purpose of 
“encourag[ing] others to cosponsor or oppose a bill.” R. ERIC PETERSON, CRS REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS, “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTERS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1, http://digital. 
library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2005/upl-meta-crs-6161/RS21667_2005Jan04.pdf. The 
letters generally include a description of the proposed legislation along with reasons for 
supporting or opposing it. Id. at 2.  
 28 Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 935; see also Dear Colleague 
Letter from Norma Cantu, Ass’t Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Clarification of 
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), http:// 
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter Clarification Memo]. 
The “‘Clarification Memorandum’ . . . provide[s] further information and guidelines for 
assessing compliance under the three part test” and “contains many examples 
illustrating how institutions may meet each prong of the [OCR Policy Interpretation’s] 
three-part test and explains how participation opportunities are to be counted under 
Title IX.” Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir. 1996).  
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debate—with great ramifications for college athletics—arose as 
to the interpretation of the phrase “receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”29 Those who favored the “institution-wide approach” 
interpreted the phrase as requiring an entire institution to 
comply with the requirements of Title IX if any of its programs 
or departments received federal funds; those who favored the 
“program specific approach,” however, interpreted the phrase as 
requiring only the particular program or department receiving 
the funds to comply with Title IX requirements.30 With the 1988 
amendments to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 
Congress settled the debate in favor of the “institution-wide 
approach,” clarifying that the terms “program or activity” and 
“program” within the meaning of Title IX refer to “all of the 
operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary 
institution, or a public system of higher education, . . . any part 
of which is extended Federal financial assistance.”31 This 
interpretation had “major implications for college athletics,” 
since universities receiving federal financial assistance in areas 
as distinct as research and scholarship funds were required to 
apply the Title IX requirements in their athletic departments.32 
For example, the University of Rochester, a private research 
institution in New York State, received $34.5 million in 2009 
“from research programs funded by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.”33 Although these federal grants “fund a broad 
array of scientific programs” having nothing to do with 
athletics,34 the university’s receipt of them means that not only 
its science programs, but all of the university’s programs, 
including the athletic department, are subject to the 
requirements of Title IX.  
Title IX provides both a complex administrative 
enforcement scheme, as well as a private cause of action for 
individuals.35 The administrative scheme allows injured 
persons to file complaints with the Department of Education, 
  
 29 See generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Suits by Female College Athletes 
Against Colleges and Universities Claiming that Decisions to Discontinue Particular 
Sports or to Deny Varsity Status to Particular Sports Deprive Plaintiffs of Equal 
Educational Opportunities Required by Title IX, 129 A.L.R. FED. 571 (1996). 
 30 Id.  
 31 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006). 
 32 Porto, supra note 29, at § 2[a]. 
 33 University Receives $34.5M in Federal Stimulus Funding, UNIV. OF 
ROCHESTER NEWS (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.rochester.edu/news/show.php?id=3466. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:07-cv-1488, 2007 WL 4365521, 
at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007). 
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which both investigates these allegations and periodically 
conducts its own “compliance reviews.”36 If the Department of 
Education finds that an institution is in violation of Title IX, it 
first attempts to remedy the situation informally, and if 
unsuccessful, may hold an administrative hearing that could 
result in the termination of the institution’s federal funding.37 
As for the private cause of action, successful plaintiffs are 
entitled to a range of possible remedies, including equitable 
relief and compensatory damages.38 Alongside the 
administrative scheme, Congress’s establishment of a private 
right of action demonstrates its intent to effect strict 
enforcement of Title IX.39  
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD 
A.  Challenges to the Proportionality Standard 
The first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-
part test, the “substantial proportionality” standard, has been the 
source of much debate, challenged both for its consistency with 
the language and goals of Title IX, and for its constitutionality. 
1. Challenges Based on Section 1681(b) 
One target of attack on the “substantial proportionality” 
standard has been the potential inconsistency of the first prong 
with Section 1681(b) of the Title IX statute.40 Specifically, 
opponents of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test 
have argued that treating the first prong as a “safe harbor”—
meaning that schools are entitled to a presumption that they 
are in compliance with Title IX if they can show “substantial 
proportionality” between their male and female athletic 
participation opportunities and overall enrollment—contradicts 
Section 1681(b)’s statement, which says that Title IX does not 
require 
any education institution to grant preferential or disparate 
treatment to members of one sex on account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons 
  
 36 Id. at *5. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at *6. 
 39 Id. at *5-6. 
 40 See Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155, 174-76 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally 
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number 
or percentage of persons of that sex in any community.41 
Courts have held that the OCR Policy Interpretation’s 
three-part test is not in fact inconsistent with Section 1681(b).42 
For one thing, the language of the statute suggests that a 
proportionality standard like the one adopted in the three-part 
test is an acceptable, although not mandatory, means of 
complying with Title IX.43 Specifically, the phrase “does not 
require” implies that the remedial action that is described in the 
words that follow is not barred by the statute; if it were, the 
section would be superfluous.44 Further, the three-part test does 
not require institutions to comply with Title IX through the 
“substantial proportionality” standard, since it provides two other 
avenues of compliance, either of which is sufficient on its own.45  
2. Challenges Based on Constitutionality 
Although the Supreme Court has, in such cases as 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,46 rejected as unconstitutional 
a remedial strategy for countering discrimination that allocates 
employment opportunities in numbers proportional to a group’s 
representation in the general population, courts have found that 
the collegiate athletics context is distinct from the employment 
context and thus calls for a different result.47 In the 
employment context, members of both sexes are generally 
qualified for a given position. On the other hand, because 
college sports teams are generally gender-segregated (such that 
a man is not qualified for a women’s team and vice versa), 
decisions regarding how many athletic opportunities will be 
allocated to each gender must be determined in advance.48 
Consequently, a school’s strategy in using enrollment data to 
determine the proper allocation of its athletic opportunities is 
not equivalent to the type of remedial scheme rejected as a 
  
 41 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
 42 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 43 See id.  
 44 It is redundant to say something is not required when that thing is not 
permitted in the first place. Id. 
 45 Id. at 771 n.7. 
 46 515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995). 
 47 Neal, 198 F.3d at 772-73 n.8. 
 48 Id.  
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quota system under strict scrutiny review in Adarand.49 Under 
the intermediate scrutiny standard of review applied to 
government policies of gender classification,50 courts have 
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of Title IX and its 
accompanying Department of Education regulations, including 
the OCR Policy Interpretation.51 The OCR has made clear its 
intention to “provide[] institutions with flexibility and choice 
regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory 
participation opportunities” in their athletic programs.52 As for 
the “substantial proportionality” prong of the OCR Policy 
Interpretation’s three-part test, courts have consistently held 
that universities can bring themselves into compliance both by 
increasing athletic participation opportunities for the 
underrepresented gender and by decreasing athletic 
participation opportunities for the overrepresented gender.53  
There have been similar arguments that the first prong 
of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test violates the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments in addition to exceeding the OCR’s statutory 
authority by actually requiring the same intentional 
discrimination that Title IX forbids.54 The supposed intentional 
discrimination results from requiring universities to 
discriminate against men without regard to interests and 
abilities, but rather based solely on enrollment.55 Specifically, it 
has been argued that gender-conscious remedies should be 
  
 49 Id. The Court in Adarand reviewed the constitutionality of a federal 
government policy under strict scrutiny analysis because the policy was one of racial 
classification. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. To survive strict scrutiny review, the 
government’s policy of racial classification must serve a compelling governmental interest 
and the means chosen must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 227. 
 50 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the policy of gender 
classification must serve an important governmental objective and the means chosen 
must substantially relate to the achievement of that objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976). 
 51 Neal, 198 F.3d at 772. For a discussion of cases in which Title IX and the 
OCR Policy Interpretation have been challenged and upheld by the judicial system, see 
Elisa Hatlevig, Title IX Compliance: Looking Past the Proportionality Prong, 12 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 87 (2005). 
 52 Clarification Memo, supra note 28. 
 53 Neal, 198 F.3d at 769-70 (citing Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 
F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown 
Univ. (Cohen I), 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 54 See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 935-36 
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Neal, 198 F.3d at 767 (appellants argued that intentional discrimination 
is avoided only when schools provide opportunities in proportion to interest).  
 55 Neal, 198 F.3d at 767. 
2010] LEAVE IT ON THE FIELD 275 
permissible only to the extent that “schools provide 
opportunities to males and females in proportion to their 
relative levels of interest in sports participation.”56 Courts have 
rejected this argument, emphasizing that in light of its history, 
Title IX logically permits the use of gender-conscious remedies, 
and that these remedies should not be so limited as to render 
them ineffective.57 In a 1999 case, Neal v. Board of Trustees of 
California State Universities, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit noted that although men apparently expressed a 
greater interest in athletic participation than women, this 
“interest gap” was continuously narrowing, as more and more 
opportunities were provided for women.58 In Neal, the court 
discussed the Cohen I59 and Cohen II60 cases, which both 
addressed the question whether schools could comply with Title 
IX by making their athletic participation numbers proportional 
to enrollment as opposed to interest.61 The court in Neal 
reiterated the reasoning, employed in both Cohen I and Cohen 
II, that “a central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage 
women to participate in sports,” and that increased 
opportunities (such as available roster spots and scholarships) 
would help increase demand and dispel stereotypes that 
disfavored women in competitive sports.62 To rely on “interest” 
as opposed to enrollment in creating athletic opportunities for 
men and women, although seemingly gender-neutral, would 
certainly disfavor women, since “interest” in men’s athletics 
would begin with a significant advantage based on historical 
circumstances, and such a subjective method would run the 
risk of perpetuating stereotypes and simply maintaining the 
discriminatory status quo.63  
  
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 60 Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 61 Neal, 198 F.3d at 768. 
 62 Id. at 768-69. 
 63 Id. 
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B.  Relevant Cases 
1. Biediger v. Quinnipiac University: Laying Out the Case 
The first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation 
recently came into focus in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University,64 
where the District Court for the District of Connecticut granted 
preliminary injunctive relief to the coach and several incoming 
and current members of Quinnipiac University’s women’s 
volleyball team, prohibiting the university from eliminating 
women’s volleyball as a varsity sport for the 2009-2010 
academic year pending resolution on the merits of the case.65 In 
March 2009, Quinnipiac University announced that due to 
budgetary constraints, it planned on instituting changes to its 
varsity athletic programs.66 Specifically, the university intended 
to eliminate three sports teams—men’s golf, men’s outdoor 
track, and women’s volleyball—and to add a women’s 
competitive cheer team.67 The plan was the ultimate result of a 
2008 directive issued by the vice president of the university to 
the athletic director, Jack McDonald, to make a 5%-10% cut in 
the athletic department budget for the 2009-2010 academic 
year.68 Although McDonald’s initial proposal involved a 5% 
budget cut without the elimination of any sports teams, the 
vice president rejected this proposal and specifically directed 
him to eliminate women’s volleyball, which would free up the 
facility where the team played for a variety of other uses by the 
university, which was faced with a space crunch.69 The 
amended proposal, which included the elimination of three 
teams and budget reductions for other varsity teams, would 
result in a 7% reduction of the athletic department’s budget 
from the previous year.70  
The plaintiffs were five female athletes, all of whom 
planned to play on Quinnipiac’s volleyball team in the 2009-
2010 season, as well as the coach of the team.71 They claimed 
  
 64 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 65 Id. at 278-79.  
 66 Id. at 278. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 280, 288. 
 69 Id. at 288. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 279-80. Plaintiff Stephanie Biediger was a freshman and recipient of 
the volleyball team’s Most Valuable Player award for the 2008-2009 season. She was 
recruited to play volleyball for Quinnipiac from her home state of Texas. Plaintiff Kaya 
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that the university’s adoption of its proposed plan would render 
it noncompliant with the requirements of Title IX.72 In the 
2008-2009 academic year, Quinnipiac had an undergraduate 
enrollment of 5455 students: 2089 (38.3%) men and 3366 
(61.7%) women.73 However, on its annual Equity in Athletics 
Disclosure Act (EADA)74 report for 2007-2008, it reported 
athletic participation opportunities of 45% for men and 54% for 
women, and on its preliminary EADA report for 2008-2009, it 
reported 47.43% for men and 52.57% for women, percentages it 
conceded were not in proportion with those of the 
undergraduate population.75 Further, in 2006, the university 
performed a “gender equity self-study,” which “revealed that 
the school was not achieving gender equity in its athletic 
participation opportunities.”76 In response to this finding, the 
athletic department decided to implement a roster management 
policy in 2006.77 Under this policy, McDonald and the senior staff 
of the athletic department set a roster size for each varsity team, 
  
Lawler, also a freshman in the 2008-2009 season, was recruited for the team from her 
home state of Indiana. Plaintiff L.R. was a high school senior from Ohio who had been 
recruited to join the team in fall of 2009. Plaintiff Erin Overdevest was a senior in 2008-
2009, who redshirted the season due to a shoulder injury and intended to play her final 
year of eligibility in 2009-2010 while completing a five-year bachelors/masters 
occupational therapy program at the university. Plaintiff Kristen Corinaldesi was a 
junior during the 2008-2009 season who intended to play as a senior in 2009-2010. 
Plaintiff Robin Lamott Sparks was recruited for the position of head coach of the women’s 
volleyball team in the spring of 2007. Although her employment contract was due to 
expire in June 2009, she expected it would be renewed until the university announced the 
plan to eliminate the volleyball team. Id. Since the original grant of a preliminary 
injunction, a class consisting of “[a]ll present, prospective, and future female students at 
Quinnipiac University who are harmed by and want to end Quinnipiac University’s sex 
discrimination in: (1) the allocation of athletic participation opportunities; (2) the 
allocation of athletic financial assistance; and (3) the allocation of benefits provided to 
varsity athletes” has been certified by the court. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 
3:09cv621, 2010 WL 2017773, at *1, *8 (D. Conn. May 20, 2010). 
 72 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 279.  
 73 Id. at 280. 
 74 The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
requires co-educational institutions of postsecondary education that 
participate in a Title IV, federal student financial assistance program, and 
have an intercollegiate athletic program, to prepare an annual report to the 
Department of Education on athletic participation, staffing, and revenues 
and expenses, by men’s and women’s teams. The Department will use this 
information in preparing its required report to the Congress on gender equity 
in intercollegiate athletics. 
Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act Summary, http://www.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/ 
athletics/eada.html; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2006). 
 75 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 281. 
 76 Id. at 283. 
 77 Id. 
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and the coaches were expected to have the set number of 
athletes on their rosters the first day of competition.78 According 
to McDonald, the roster management policy provided the benefit 
of being able to increase athletic participation opportunities for 
women without adding more sports teams by simply adding 
roster spots to already existing teams.79  
The university announced that its new plan was 
designed to reduce overall athletic spending while maintaining 
percentages of athletic participation opportunities for men and 
women in substantial proportion to its anticipated 
undergraduate enrollment for the 2009-2010 academic year.80 
Therefore, Quinnipiac relied upon satisfaction of the first prong 
of the OCR Policy Interpretation for compliance with Title IX 
in 2009-2010.81 The court noted that failure to meet this prong 
would, without a doubt, render the university noncompliant 
since the other two prongs were clearly not satisfied.82 Plaintiffs 
put forth several arguments to show that the university’s plan 
would fail to achieve the substantial proportionality required 
by the first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation.83 The court 
concluded that two of these arguments—that Quinnipiac used 
an improper method of counting track athletes, and that 
competitive cheer did not qualify as a “sport” under Title IX 
analysis—were unlikely to succeed on the merits.84 However, 
the court determined that a third argument was likely to 
prevail; namely, the argument that Quinnipiac did not satisfy 
the first prong “due to problems with its roster management 
policy and its reliance on setting roster floors for women’s 
teams.”85 Specifically, the court found that as it was being 
  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. at 283. 
 81 Recall that the first prong looks to “[w]hether intercollegiate level 
participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments.” 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 
71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
 82 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 294. The court noted that the second and third 
prongs would not be satisfied because, by eliminating women’s volleyball when there 
was sufficient interest to field a team, the university would fail to demonstrate a 
commitment to “expanding opportunities for the underrepresented gender”—the 
requirement of the second prong—or that it had “fully and effectively accommodated 
the interests and abilities of that underrepresented gender”—the requirement of the 
third prong. Id.  
 83 Id. at 295. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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employed, the roster management policy did not “produce 
sufficient genuine participation opportunities for women.”86  
Quinnipiac argued that its overall plan—a plan that 
included (1) the elimination of two men’s teams and one 
women’s team; (2) the elevation of one women’s team to varsity 
status; and (3) the continuation of roster management 
policies—would result in 63% women and 37% men 
composition of athletic participants, mirroring that of the 
student population.87 It pointed to the 1996 OCR Clarification 
of the Policy Interpretation’s three-part test to justify these 
practices, specifically the Clarification’s explicit acceptance of 
roster management practices, “including capping participation 
opportunities and cutting teams, as acceptable measures to 
achieve substantial proportionality.”88 The OCR Clarification 
also weighed in favor of the university by stating that, 
generally, not only would the OCR count athletes reported on a 
squad list on the first day of competition as participants, but it 
would also count those athletes who practice but do not 
compete with the team.89 This was significant for Quinnipiac, 
since its roster management policies involved having coaches 
fill a predetermined number of roster spots, which were 
recorded by the athletic department on the first day of 
competition, and therefore were computed into the EADA 
report.90 If some of these athletes continued to practice with the 
team but were no longer part of the competition roster, 
Quinnipiac could still count them as participants.91 
The court, however, noted that the OCR Clarification 
Memorandum and its accompanying “Dear Colleague” letter 
also advised that “participation opportunities must be real, not 
illusory.”92 With this in mind, the court looked to the evidence 
to determine the real impact of the roster management policy 
as it was being used by Quinnipiac’s athletic department.93 The 
policy, although introduced in 2006, was first enforced during 
the 2007-2008 season.94 It was laid out in the athletic 
department’s staff manual and also discussed at the annual 
  
 86 Id. at 296. 
 87 Id. at 294. 
 88 Id. at 296; Clarification Memo, supra note 28.  
 89 Clarification Memo, supra note 28. 
 90 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 283. 
 91 Id. at 286. 
 92 Id. at 296. 
 93 Id. at 283-88. 
 94 Id. at 283. 
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athletic department staff meeting.95 Both the athletic director, 
Jack McDonald, and the Senior Women’s Administrator and 
Assistant Athletic Director for Compliance,96 Tracy Flynn, 
testified that the reactions among coaches to the 
implementation of the roster management policy were 
negative.97 The general response from men’s team coaches was 
that the set roster numbers were too low in relation to their 
needs, and the general response from women’s team coaches 
was that the numbers were too high.98 While the EADA report 
for the 2007-2008 season indicated that the set roster numbers 
were adhered to so that the university achieved substantial 
proportionality, testimony of members of the athletic 
department, along with the “add/delete” lists for the 2007-2008 
season, revealed that the EADA report did not tell the full 
story.99 Two men’s teams, baseball and lacrosse, had “deleted” 
team members from the roster prior to the first day of 
competition and then “added” them back to the team for the 
remainder of the season, changes that were never reflected in 
the EADA report provided to the Department of Education.100 
Similarly, several women’s teams used this “add/delete” 
strategy to the opposite effect, adding players before the first 
day of competition who were subsequently cut from the team or 
quit.101 Flynn testified that such “roster manipulation” 
decreased in the 2008-2009 season based on the “add/delete” 
lists, but the testimony of McDonald and the women’s softball 
coach, Germaine Fairchild, confirmed that it still occurred.102  
2. Biediger: The Outcome 
It is unsurprising that the court found that if such 
roster manipulations were, in fact, occurring to a degree 
sufficient to skew the numbers so that substantial 
proportionality was no longer achieved, it would prevent 
  
 95 Id. 
 96 This position entails ensuring the university’s compliance with NCAA 
rules and regulations; overseeing the university’s budget and “add/delete” list; and 
along with the athletic director, compiling the annual EADA report. Id. at 280. 
 97 Id. at 283. 
 98 Id. at 283-84. 
 99 Id. at 284. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 285. 
 102 Id. at 287. 
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Quinnipiac from satisfying the first prong of the OCR Policy 
Interpretation’s three-part test.103 As the court noted, Title IX 
requires more than merely showing gender equity on the EADA 
report. Although an EADA report can be used to make a prima facie 
showing of substantial proportionately, plaintiffs are permitted to 
look beyond those numbers, as they have done here, to determine 
whether those EADA numbers actually represent genuine, not 
illusory, athletic participation opportunities.104  
The court further concluded that there was no indication that 
the roster manipulations would cease in the 2009-2010 season, 
when the university planned to institute its new plan.105 If the 
gap between the numbers recorded on the EADA report and 
the actual participation numbers in 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 
remained consistent in 2009-2010, then “retaining the women’s 
volleyball team would only just restore proportionality.”106 The 
court held that this reasoning was sufficient to grant the 
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, prohibiting Quinnipiac 
from eliminating the women’s volleyball team for the 2009-
2010 season.107 
3. Choike v. Slippery Rock University 
The Biediger court discussed one other case, Choike v. 
Slippery Rock University,108 in which a court examined a 
university’s roster management policy in making a 
determination on Title IX compliance.109 In that case, as in 
Biediger, Slippery Rock University implemented roster 
management as a means of remedying its known violations of 
Title IX.110 Although the university had failed in its attempt to 
use roster management in the past by not including any 
repercussions for coaches who did not meet targets, it planned 
to strictly enforce the policy in the upcoming year.111 However, 
for several reasons, the court found that the university’s plan 
to achieve substantial proportionality through use of its 
proposed roster management plan was “too speculative at this 
  
 103 Id. at 298. 
 104 Id. at 297. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 298. 
 108 No. 06-622, 2006 WL 2060576 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2006). 
 109 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97. 
 110 Choike, 2006 WL 2060576, at *4. 
 111 Id. 
282 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
juncture to satisfy Title IX.”112 First, like the situation in 
Biediger, its use of roster management had failed in the past.113 
Second, the proposed plan created many new roster spots on 
women’s sports teams with “no indication that the current SRU 
female student population would actually fill these newly 
created positions.”114 Because the set roster sizes for women’s 
teams were not a product of “research as to the needs or wants 
of the female students, but based purely on the number of 
positions that coaches wanted to make available to the male 
athletes,” the court found the new target numbers “artificial.”115 
For example, despite the university president’s testimony that 
he instructed coaches not to “pad” teams with players who would 
not have the opportunity to meaningfully participate, the 
university allocated twenty-eight roster spots for women’s cross 
country, compared to sixteen for the men’s team, and twenty-
eight roster spots for women’s soccer, compared to twenty-five 
for the men’s team.116 In sum, the court found that allocations of 
roster spots that achieve substantial proportionality only on 
paper were insufficient: “[w]hile the allocated positions might 
satisfy the proportionality requirement if viewed in a vacuum, 
compliance would not be meaningful.”117  
4. Biediger and Choike Compared 
The court’s decision in Biediger is consistent with 
Choike in that it too looked past the recorded numbers to reach 
the conclusion that substantial proportionality, and thus the 
requirement of the first prong of the OCR Policy 
Interpretation’s three-part test, required something more 
meaningful.118 Arguably, however, Biediger went further than 
Choike because it determined that even if Quinnipiac’s 
reported numbers were technically correct—in that the number 
of athletes reported on the EADA report accurately reflected 
the number of students who remained on the team throughout 
the season—the policy of setting roster floors could still create 
a Title IX compliance problem because the participation of 
  
 112 Id. at *8. 
 113 Id. at *4. 
 114 Id. at *8. 
 115 Id. at *7. 
 116 Id. at *8. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 297 (D. Conn. 2009). 
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some of these athletes might not be “meaningful.”119 In other 
words, Choike suggested that the university could meet the 
requirement of substantial proportionality if it had a stronger 
basis for showing that the spots allotted to female athletes 
would, in fact, be filled,120 whereas Biediger suggested that 
merely filling the spots still might not be enough to constitute 
“meaningful participation.”121  
The court in Biediger acknowledged that “further 
evidence and analysis of Quinnipiac’s roster management 
policy as it affects the individual teams” would be necessary 
before it could make a decision on the merits as to whether the 
university satisfied the “substantial proportionality” standard 
of the first prong of the three-part test.122 The court adopted the 
view that the first prong serves as a “safe harbor” for 
universities, so that achieving gender parity between the body 
of student-athletes and the student body at large is enough for 
an athletic program to comply with Title IX.123 However, it 
stressed that “the focus of prong one . . . is genuine 
participation opportunities.”124 In this light, the court said that 
Quinnipiac’s roster management policy, and specifically the 
practice of setting roster floors, would likely fail to satisfy the 
first prong.125 Although roster management policies had been 
deemed an acceptable means of satisfying the first prong in 
previous cases, the court “found no case law or other authority 
that sanctions the use of floors—in contrast to the use of caps,” 
as part of such policies.126 According to the court, the distinction 
between the two was great—“[t]here is a significantly different 
impact on athletic participation opportunities resulting from the 
use of roster floors than from the use of roster caps.”127 
Specifically, while roster caps limit the number of participants, 
and consequently might deny opportunities to some students 
  
 119 See id. at 298 (“The plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated that the 
practice of setting roster floors does not correspond to an equal number of genuine 
athletic participation opportunities, which is what matters for purposes of complying 
with Title IX in spirit and in fact.”).  
 120 “Unless and until SRU can demonstrate that those additional positions are 
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prong of Title IX.” Choike, 2006 WL 2060576, at *8. 
 121 See Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 298. 
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who are able and willing to meaningfully participate, roster 
floors require that a certain number of spots be filled regardless 
of whether there are enough qualified athletes to fill them.128  
The court reasoned that “players whose principal role is 
to provide a gender statistic” are not being provided with 
genuine participation opportunities.129 The testimony of the 
Quinnipiac head women’s softball coach, Germaine Fairchild, 
supported this contention. Fairchild said that she felt pressure 
to accept more players than were necessary130 and than she 
could reasonably accommodate, given the team’s budget and 
coaching resources.131 Despite this, along with her explanation 
that she could not provide a “legitimate Division I experience” 
to that many players, Fairchild received no guidance or 
additional support from the athletic department in order to 
adjust to the requirement.132 Further, although the 1996 OCR 
Clarification specified that athletes who practice but do not 
compete with a team are considered participants,133 Fairchild’s 
testimony demonstrated that if these athletes were there 
strictly to fulfill a requirement, their participation was likely 
not meaningful.134 In order to “make the numbers” in 2007, 
Fairchild accepted onto the team all of the athletes who tried 
out, but after the first day of competition, she informed several 
of them that they would be on the “practice squad,” and 
therefore would not have uniforms and could not travel with 
the team.135 She testified that nine players quit the team over 
the course of the next several months, bringing the roster size 
down to seventeen, a reduction of over one third of the initial 
roster, for the start of the competitive spring season.136 
C.  Implications of Biediger  
Arguably, the willingness of the Biediger court to look 
beyond the numbers in the manner it did represents a decrease 
in the security of the “safe harbor” prong of the OCR Policy 
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 130 The roster floor was set at twenty-five players, though Fairchild usually 
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 133 Clarification Memo, supra note 28. 
 134 Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 285, 298. 
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Interpretation’s three-part test. This is significant because the 
“substantial proportionality” standard is the “least subjective of 
the three compliance avenues monitored by the Office for Civil 
Rights.”137 The court made a compelling argument as to why 
roster floors may pose a problem with regard to providing 
genuine athletic opportunities to both sexes under the 
requirement of the first prong. However, in doing so, it chose to 
examine the quality of the participation in a manner that 
courts have not previously utilized when considering the 
“substantial proportionality” standard. Although the court 
noted that the specific practice of setting roster floors—in 
contrast with roster management policies in general—had 
never been authorized by the courts,138 the use of both floors 
and caps has become a common practice among National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) programs.139 The trend 
is consistent with what the court found had occurred at 
Quinnipiac—namely, (1) that men’s team coaches “often 
fe[lt] . . . restricted,” forced to make cuts where they otherwise 
would not; and (2) that women’s team coaches “face[d] having 
to convince more players to fill roster spots,” where “the 
additions may not possess the talent or desire of their 
teammates.”140 In response to the criticism that “roster 
management is simply making more room on the bench for 
female athletes,” a former collegiate athletic administrator and 
NCAA lecturer on the subject of roster management, Elaine 
Driedame, has advised that when it is well implemented, roster 
management need not have this effect, at least not to a 
significant degree.141 However, Driedame acknowledges 
successful implementation of roster management depends on 
focusing more on controlling roster sizes of men’s teams than 
on imposing roster floors on women’s teams.142 That said, 
  
 137 Paul Steinbach, Count on It, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 1, 2000), http:// 
www.athleticbusiness.com/articles/default.aspx?a=55&template=print-article.htm. 
 138  Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 296. 
 139 See Steinbach, supra note 137; Michael L. Kasavana, Roster Management Not 
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Kasavana, supra note 139; Steinbach, supra note 137. 
 140 Steinbach, supra note 137. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
286 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
Driedame supports a limited amount of “padding” women’s 
teams with additional players—for example, a soccer squad of 
thirty or thirty-five as opposed to twenty-eight or thirty—so 
long as these additions come with the appropriate coaching 
resources.143 She suggests that teams forced to carry additional 
players take measures such as beginning the season earlier to 
stimulate enthusiasm among women who will likely see little 
playing time, and notes that athletes are more likely to remain 
on the team if they feel they are receiving adequate attention 
and are improving.144 
Driedame’s remarks are particularly insightful with 
regard to Biediger in light of the testimony of Quinnipiac’s 
women’s softball coach, Germaine Fairchild, regarding her 
experience with the university’s roster management policy. 
Fairchild was required to take at least twenty-five players on 
her team, which represented almost a 40% increase over the size 
of her typical roster.145 The dramatic increase in players, 
however, did not come with an “increase in budget, extra 
equipment, additional assistant coaches, or a raise in salary to 
account for and/or accommodate the extra players.”146 Further, 
Fairchild testified that the target roster number for her team 
was set without her input as to what was reasonable, and that 
she was provided with no further guidance on how to manage 
under the policy.147 Even Quinnipiac’s athletic director Jack 
McDonald testified that decisions about roster sizes were made 
with little input from coaches, “except in the case of ‘like’ sports, 
such as men’s and women’s soccer, whose coaches were asked to 
agree on similar roster sizes.”148 The athletic department also 
made these decisions without considering the average roster 
sizes of teams in Quinnipiac’s athletic conference, instead only 
relying on the average roster sizes for all of the NCAA.149 Thus, 
Quinnipiac’s approach to implementing a roster management 
policy contradicted Driedame’s advice that before mandating 
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any numbers, athletic department heads should “discuss the 
facts” with the coaches.150 Overall, there are strong arguments for 
upholding roster management policies, including both roster 
caps and floors, as part of schools’ Title IX compliance efforts. 
However, as Biediger illustrates, athletic departments should be 
vigilant to ensure that these policies both comply with the 
statute and succeed in practicality. 
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Courts Should Balance the Interests in Enforcing Title 
IX Compliance 
One cannot deny the glaring evidence of gender 
discrimination in education that prompted Congress to enact 
Title IX. Nor can one deny the impact the statute has had in 
remedying such discrimination, especially in the area of 
athletics.151 However, it is risky to empower both the federal 
government and the courts with authority over the affairs of 
educational institutions, and Title IX decisions concerning 
collegiate athletics have been particularly controversial.152 In 
recent years, some have suggested that the law, at least as it 
pertains to college athletic programs, is outdated.153 As such, 
although Title IX was an appropriate remedy in 1972, Congress 
should now take a new approach that accounts for women’s 
increased participation in sports.154 As one Delaware University 
student-athlete argued, “[n]ow that women’s sports are the 
norm for college campuses, it should be up to those institutions 
which sports and how much of them their community needs.”155 
On the other hand, there is significant evidence that gender 
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discrimination, although diminished, continues to exist in 
collegiate athletics and that Title IX remains essential to push 
schools toward equality.156 Therefore, strictly enforcing Title IX 
remains a strong public interest. As a result, courts must 
perform a balancing act when enforcement of this interest relies 
on universities that make autonomous spending decisions.  
1. The Reality of Budget Restrictions 
Much of the resentment surrounding Title IX and 
collegiate athletics has stemmed from the fact that many 
universities have eliminated sports teams in their efforts to 
comply with Title IX and the regulations of its enforcement 
agency.157 When athletic opportunities are taken away from 
students, it is not as satisfying to celebrate their gender 
equality. While adding teams for the underrepresented gender 
seems to be an equally strong option for bringing schools into 
compliance under the “substantial proportionality” standard of 
the first prong, it is important to remember that university 
athletic departments are limited by budget restrictions.158 
Perhaps the biggest advantage of roster management policies is 
their potential to help bring universities into compliance with 
the first prong without taking more drastic measures, such as 
eliminating or adding teams.159 However, as Biediger illustrates, 
roster management is sometimes used in conjunction with other 
measures, such as cutting teams, in an attempt to achieve 
substantial proportionality when faced with a budget crunch. 
For better or worse, education in the United States has 
become highly intertwined with college athletics, and for many 
schools, athletic programs are a big business.160 This is 
particularly true for universities whose sports teams compete 
in the NCAA Division I, the highest level of intercollegiate 
competition.161 Although some argue that the resources devoted 
to collegiate athletic programs are excessive, “[f]or most 
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schools, the decision to maintain—or even grow—athletic 
programs is unquestioned because of the perceived benefits to 
the campus as a whole.”162 These “perceived benefits” derive 
from the image of having major sports teams associated with a 
university’s name, which gives the institution a higher 
profile.163 Although universities with athletic departments in all 
three NCAA Divisions maintain programs at least to some 
degree for direct benefit of student-athletes,164 Division I 
programs in particular emphasize the experience of the 
spectators.165 Given the “business” aspect of athletics at many of 
these schools, a conflict often arises between the need to 
comply with Title IX, on the one hand, and the pressure to 
make profitable decisions for the university regarding how 
many and which sports teams to support, budget allotment, 
and controlling roster sizes, on the other. 
2. Cases Illustrating the Conflict 
An example of this type of conflict was illustrated in a 
1993 case, Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, in 
which the court issued a preliminary injunction against 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania based on its finding that 
the university had violated Title IX by cutting certain women’s 
teams.166 Specifically, the court found that the university failed 
to satisfy either the “substantial proportionality” prong or the 
other two prongs of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part 
test.167 The vice president of student affairs gave testimony 
regarding the “importance of football and men’s basketball in 
terms of prestige and of their being important factors in 
attracting the attention of potential students.”168 Although the 
court said it sympathized with the university’s position and 
understood both that football was an expensive sport to fund 
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and that, due to its large roster, it was largely responsible for 
the imbalance in the male-to-female athlete ratio, it stated 
bluntly that these facts did not get the university off the hook: 
“Title IX does not provide for any exception to its requirements 
simply because of a school’s financial difficulties. In other 
words, a cash crunch is no excuse.”169 The fact that football 
teams typically carry very large rosters consistently creates a 
challenge for schools that have such teams; because it is rare 
for any women’s team to carry a roster comparable in size, it 
usually takes multiple women’s teams to offset these numbers.170 
However, as the Favia court made clear, Title IX makes no 
exceptions to account for such challenges.171 Further, the 
“substantial proportionality” prong refers only to numbers of 
individual athletic participants, not to the ratio of men’s teams to 
women’s teams offered by a university.172 
Courts have rightly held that the public interest is 
served by promoting compliance with Title IX.173 However, a 
university has reason to argue that it is in a better position 
than the courts “to decide both which intercollegiate sports best 
meet the needs and interests of its own students, and how to 
allocate resources during a difficult economic time.”174 In 
Choike, Slippery Rock University made a similar public policy 
argument against the injunctive relief sought by the 
plaintiffs—namely, to order the university to reinstate the 
women’s swimming team and women’s water polo team for the 
2006-2007 academic year.175 The argument was that the public 
interest was best served by the university using its federal 
funds to “support the essential academic functions of a public 
university, and thereby encourage a wide and diverse range of 
academic disciplines and degree programs, rather than provide 
a specific, extracurricular athletic opportunity for a small 
number of individual students.”176 The court agreed with this 
argument but stated that it was nonetheless impermissible for 
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the university to provide extracurricular opportunities (if it 
chose to provide them) in disproportionately large numbers to 
men.177 The court also noted that if the university implemented 
a plan that brought it into compliance with Title IX, such as a 
roster management policy that it could demonstrate actually 
worked, it might be permitted to eliminate the women’s 
swimming and women’s water polo teams.178 In this way, the 
court made it clear that its ruling was not meant to impose a 
specific plan upon Slippery Rock University’s athletic 
department, therefore depriving it of its choice as to what 
sports teams to field and fund, but rather to prevent the 
university from taking steps to bring it further out of 
compliance with Title IX.  
Despite the Choike court’s statement that it “[did] not 
mean to minimize SRU’s valid concern of judicial interference 
with its independence in deciding how to allocate its limited 
financial resources,”179 it easily concluded that the estimated 
$65,000 it would cost the university to maintain the women’s 
swimming and women’s water polo teams for the 2006-2007 
academic year was “minimal” compared to the potential harm 
to the plaintiff athletes if their teams were eliminated.180 
Notably, in this instance, Slippery Rock University’s athletic 
department had not haphazardly chosen to eliminate some of 
its women’s sports teams. In fact, five of the eight teams that 
were eliminated as part of the budget-reducing plan were 
men’s teams, and the decisions were based on “a spreadsheet 
with a set of criteria by which all 23 teams would be assessed 
and ranked.”181 These criteria “included both financial data . . . 
and non-financial evaluative measures, such as how competitive 
each team was, the academic performance of the student-athletes, 
the quality of the coaching staff, and the condition of the 
facilities.”182 Missing from the university’s spreadsheet, despite 
  
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at *9. 
 179 Id.  
 180 Id. at *10. In a similar circumstance involving judicial override of a 
university’s decision as to how to use its resources, the Biediger court, in assessing 
potential harm to a university by granting a prohibitory injunction, stated that it was 
“unconvinced that the ‘space crunch’ at Quinnipiac [was] so severe that the University 
would be unable to accommodate the volleyball team’s practice and competition 
schedule on the Burt Kahn Court where they currently play[ed], or to make other 
arrangements for the team.” Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 293 (D. 
Conn. 2009). 
 181 Choike, 2006 WL 2060576, at *3. 
 182 Id. 
292 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
recommendations by the University Athletic Council that they be 
included, were considerations about gender equity and Title IX 
compliance.183 Further, the university president deliberately 
disregarded the University Athletic Council’s advice on this 
matter because “he wanted to keep financial decisions completely 
separate from Title IX decisions.”184  
3. Achieving the Balance 
As Choike and other cases illustrate, the desire to keep 
financial considerations distinct from Title IX decisions is 
wholly unrealistic. Decisions made in order to comply or 
maintain compliance with Title IX are oftentimes not 
financially convenient for a university, and may even be 
financially injurious. The bottom line is that schools must 
accept this reality and courts should not accept the “budget 
crunch” excuse to gender discrimination. At the same time, 
when fashioning remedies, courts should keep in mind the 
OCR’s intention to “provide[] institutions with flexibility and 
choice regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory 
participation opportunities” in their athletic programs.185  
Courts have recognized the importance of allowing 
schools to maintain a degree of autonomy in making funding 
decisions. For instance, in a case in which state university 
students challenged as unconstitutional the school’s refusal to 
fund certain religious-oriented activities out of its segregated 
fee account, the court noted “that it would not be in the public 
interest to enter a permanent injunction that compels the 
university to fund, or prohibits the university from refusing to 
fund, any particular category of activity.”186 Likewise, courts 
have employed “balancing of interests” approaches in related 
contexts. For instance, in fashioning remedies under the 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, courts often 
balance the interests of a school district, taking into account its 
use of resources, with the interests of the disabled student and 
his or her family.187 We are at juncture where great strides have 
been made, and yet significant action remains necessary to 
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eliminate gender discrimination in sports and where schools 
face unprecedented budgetary constraints.188 Especially given 
these circumstances, courts must balance competing interests 
to enforce Title IX effectively while minimizing judicial 
interference in the functions of educational institutions.  
B.  The Substantial Proportionality Standard and the 
Meaningful Participation Requirement Should Remain 
Objective 
In Choike, the real trouble for Slippery Rock University 
was that it was aware that it had not been compliant with Title 
IX at least from 2001 through 2005 (either in achieving 
substantial proportionality or in satisfying the other 
requirements of the OCR’s regulations)189 and that it eliminated 
women’s sports teams.190 In other words, knowing that a 
disproportionately small number of its athletic participants 
were women, it still took measures that worked to aggravate, 
rather than rectify, the situation. The court granted a 
preliminary injunction in Biediger for virtually the same 
reasons.191 Furthermore, in Choike, as in Biediger, the 
university was relying on a roster management policy as an 
integral part of the overall plan to bring it into compliance with 
Title IX and, specifically, with the “substantial proportionality” 
standard of the first prong.192 However, in both cases, the courts 
found that the roster management policies as implemented did 
not provide the “meaningful participation” required by the first 
prong.193 Specifically, both courts found that athletic 
participation opportunities were offered in numbers 
substantially proportional to the gender compositions of the 
schools’ student bodies only on paper.194  
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In Choike, the problem that prevented participation 
opportunities from being “meaningful” was that the university 
provided no evidence that it had the ability to fill all of the 
roster spots it allotted to women’s teams.195 In Biediger, the 
roster management policy created more complex impediments 
to achieving “meaningful participation.” In the years since 
implementation, women tried out for the teams in sufficient 
numbers to fill the set roster spots.196 However, many of the 
women who represented the “extra” roster spots—added 
through the roster management policy—did not remain on the 
team throughout the season; rather, the coaches either cut 
them or they chose to leave.197 Understandably, the court 
concluded that regardless of what the EADA reports showed, 
women who did not remain on a team for a significant portion 
of the season were not “meaningful” participants.198 The 
concerning aspect of the court’s opinion is its assertion that 
even if the women remained on the team throughout the 
season, their participation might not be “meaningful” such that 
they would count as participants for purposes of the first prong 
of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test.199 The OCR 
has specifically said that athletes who only practice with, but 
do not compete on, a team may be counted as participants for 
purposes of Title IX.200 It should not be the court’s role to decide 
if an athlete who has chosen to remain on a team, whether on 
the competition roster or in a practice-only capacity, is a 
meaningful participant in athletics. The fact that an athlete 
has made the decision to remain on the team signifies that the 
experience is “meaningful” enough to her to justify her 
commitment to the team. How meaningful a judge perceives 
that personal experience to be should not factor into the 
equation. In other words, it should not be the role of a court to 
examine the quality of an athlete’s participation in determining 
whether to count that athlete for purposes of compliance with 
the “substantial proportionality” standard. 
If courts were to take the activist approach implied in 
Biediger, what factors would they use in determining whether 
the quality of participation met the threshold for being 
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“meaningful”? Arguably, this approach would create confusion 
and lead to arbitrary results. The 1979 OCR Policy 
Interpretation laid out three specific areas to help guide 
institutions in their compliance efforts: equal athletic financial 
assistance, equal treatment and benefits for athletic teams, and 
effective accommodation of student interests and abilities.201 The 
OCR Policy Interpretation included the three-part test in order 
to define what constitutes the third of these areas, effective 
accommodation of students’ interests and abilities.202 Therefore, 
regardless of whether, or how, an institution complies with the 
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test, it is still required to 
show compliance in the other two areas: equal athletic financial 
assistance, and equal treatment and benefits for athletic 
teams.203 Presumably, factors such as the amount of financial 
assistance and the treatment and benefits afforded an athletic 
team would affect how “meaningful” participation is for the 
athletes on that team. However, these factors are considered 
independently of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test 
and should play no role in an assessment of whether an 
institution satisfies the first prong of that test, the “substantial 
proportionality” standard. The first prong is intended to be an 
objective standard, and despite the arguments against it being 
considered a “safe harbor,” there are important reasons why it 
should remain objective.  
C.  The Biediger Court Should Not Have Expanded the Scope of 
Analysis Under the Substantial Proportionality Prong 
As this part of the note has already discussed, Title IX 
compliance can impose significant challenges for universities 
by requiring them to use what are often limited financial 
resources for athletic programs in ways that do not necessarily 
maximize financial gain and in ways that inevitably leave 
certain parties dissatisfied.204 Despite these challenges, Title IX 
has proven instrumental in providing more equitable collegiate 
athletic opportunities for women, who were largely excluded 
from such opportunities for many years.205 Therefore, the 
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statute and its regulations continue to have great importance 
in this arena, and the challenges they impose upon universities 
are justified by the rewards. Nevertheless, universities serve 
extremely important functions beyond their athletic programs, 
and their ability to execute these functions is compromised 
when they become embroiled in litigation. OCR’s pattern of 
regulations, interpretations of those regulations, and 
clarification memoranda regarding Title IX in the area of 
collegiate athletics indicates its intention to guide institutions 
in their efforts by clearly defining their responsibilities.206 The 
phrase “[e]ffective [a]ccommodation of student[s’] [i]nterests 
and [a]bilities”207 is an ambiguous standard. The OCR 
apparently recognized this ambiguity in its adoption of the 
three-part test. Within that test, the OCR rightfully included a 
largely objective standard, the “substantial proportionality” 
standard, which would allow universities to work toward the 
clear and comprehensive goal of providing participation 
opportunities for male and female students in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments, and 
therefore would entitle them to a presumption that effective 
accommodation has been satisfied.208 The OCR’s 1996 
Clarification Memorandum also stated, as the Choike and 
Biediger courts noted, that the “participation opportunities 
must be real, not illusory.”209 The Choike court went on to say 
that the participation opportunities had to be “meaningful” but 
explicitly defined meaningful in this situation as “filled” with 
actual athletes.210 The Biediger court used the word “genuine” 
as a contrast to “illusory” yet went further than Choike, 
suggesting that “filled” might not be enough to satisfy the 
requirement.211 In terms of analysis under the first prong of the 
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test, the Biediger court 
should not have gone further than Choike by entering the 
territory of examining the quality of an athlete’s personal 
experience to determine whether it was sufficiently “genuine.” 
Regardless of the outcome of this particular case on the merits, 
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however, courts should refrain from expanding analysis under 
the “substantial proportionality” standard in this manner.  
D.  Roster Floors Should Be Permitted 
The Biediger court held that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on the merits because “[e]ither one of those problems—
inaccurate roster numbers or setting false roster floors—is 
sufficient to knock Quinnipiac out of compliance with Title IX.”212 
The court’s reference to “false” roster floors indicated the policy 
required coaches to take more athletes on a team than they 
would otherwise choose based on the needs and resources of the 
team.213 In one regard, the court in Biediger was justified in 
looking with a critical eye at roster floors as part of a 
university’s roster management policy. It is clear why the use of 
roster floors raises a red flag in terms of the potential for 
reported numbers that are not backed by actual athletes; there 
can be little doubt that participation opportunities that only 
exist on paper are illusory. The court in Biediger noted that 
there was no case law in which the use of roster floors 
specifically had been upheld.214 While the court did not commit to 
a blanket prohibition on roster floors as a means of complying 
with Title IX, it certainly came close: “Even if Quinnipiac’s 
roster numbers are accurate, it still has a problem complying 
with Title IX because it relies on a roster management policy of 
setting roster floors.”215 In fact, Quinnipiac’s roster management 
policy involved setting target roster numbers for each team, 
which were viewed as floors by most of the women’s team 
coaches and as caps by most of the men’s team coaches.216 As 
previously discussed, roster management policies, which have 
become a fairly common strategy college athletic departments 
use to achieve compliance with Title IX, typically involve such a 
combination of caps and floors.217  
There are several reasons why universities should not 
depend on upon roster floors in roster management policies. 
The strongest reason is that no one benefits when coaches 
are required to carry more athletes than they require and 
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can afford.218 Coaches faced with these difficulties may 
disregard the roster floor and cut players that they feel they 
are unable to dedicate proper attention to (or who do not 
contribute positively to the team due to inadequate skill 
level or desire). Alternatively, athletes may be dissatisfied 
with the experience and leave voluntarily. There was strong 
evidence in Biediger that this situation had occurred with 
some of the women’s sports teams at Quinnipiac.219 There was 
also evidence that the university’s athletic department had 
not gone about implementing the roster management policy 
in a sensible fashion.220 There are, however, strategies that 
universities can utilize to make roster management policies 
work effectively, including those that incorporate an 
appropriate number of roster floors.221  
Decisions regarding how many and what sports teams a 
university will provide in any given year take considerable 
planning and forethought.222 A great deal of effort goes into 
preparing facilities, purchasing equipment, scheduling practices 
and games, staffing, and recruiting.223 Further, although 
university athletic departments can use past and current 
enrollment figures as a gauge for the upcoming year, the gender 
composition of a student body may vary from year to year.224 
Therefore, the athletic participation ratio of men to women that 
a university needs to achieve “substantial proportionality” is 
often “a moving target.”225 This challenge makes roster 
management policies a particularly appealing option, as it 
allows a university to make decisions in advance about sports 
offerings and to make minor adjustments in target roster sizes 
for each team based on enrollment.226 For these reasons, it would 
be detrimental for a court to hold the use of roster floors to be a 
per se invalid means of achieving compliance with Title IX. 
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CONCLUSION 
This note explores the question whether an objective 
standard should be available to universities for assessing their 
compliance with Title IX in the area of collegiate athletics. It 
argues that an objective standard should be available and that 
the court in Biediger improperly applied a subjective analysis 
beyond the scope of what the OCR intended in issuing its 
regulations. To return to the hypothetical posed in the 
Introduction, it is not the proper role of the courts to examine 
the quality of the woman’s participation on the softball team 
when assessing the university’s compliance with Title IX under 
the “substantial proportionality” standard contained in the first 
prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. The 
important point is that the woman chose to join the team and 
to remain on the team throughout the season. This should 
indicate, for purposes of this prong, that the participation was 
sufficiently meaningful. Requiring a heightened showing to 
prove that participation is “meaningful” would result in 
unnecessary confusion and arbitrary decision-making. 
Furthermore, if the coach offered this woman a spot on the 
practice roster because of an obligation to comply with a roster 
floor, the use of such a roster floor should also be permissible as 
a means of complying with Title IX.  
ADDENDUM 
On July 21, 2010, following a bench trial held from June 
21 to June 25, 2010, the District of Connecticut Court issued a 
decision on the merits in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University.227 
Consistent with many of its initial findings supporting the 
grant of a preliminary injunction,228 the court concluded that 
Quinnipiac violated Title IX during the 2009-2010 academic 
year by failing to offer equal athletic participation 
opportunities for female students.229 In the opinion, the court 
analyzed the plaintiffs’ three main arguments for why the 
university was not in compliance with Title IX: (1) that 
members of the competitive cheerleading team should not be 
counted as athletes under the statute; (2) that certain cross-
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country, indoor track, and outdoor track athletes were 
improperly counted multiple times; and (3) that the 
university’s roster management policies led to roster 
manipulation as well as artificially undersized men’s teams 
and artificially oversized women’s teams.230  
With respect to the first argument, the court agreed 
that members of the cheerleading team could not be counted as 
athletes because that team did not qualify as a varsity sport for 
purposes of Title IX.231 With respect to the second argument, the 
court agreed that some female cross-country runners had been 
improperly counted multiple times for their required 
participation on the indoor and outdoor track teams.232 In 
addressing the third argument, the subject of this note, the 
court concluded: 
Finally, although I find, as a matter of fact, that Quinnipiac is no 
longer engaged in the same roster manipulation that was the basis 
for my preliminary injunction order, the University is still 
continuing to deflate the size of its men’s rosters and inflate the size 
of its women’s rosters. Although that roster management is 
insufficient to conclude that Quinnipiac violated Title IX as a matter 
of law, it supports the ultimate conclusion that the University is not 
offering equal participation opportunities for its female students.233 
The court noted the existence of little precedent “on 
judging whether an athlete’s experience on a varsity team 
qualifies as a genuine participation opportunity—i.e., whether 
his or her participation opportunity is real, and not illusory.”234 
On this point, the court was persuaded by the government’s 
encouragement, expressed in its amicus brief, to “‘look beyond 
[the] numbers’ and examine the quality of opportunities being 
offered.”235 An examination of the quality of opportunities is 
precisely the type of analysis this note argues should remain 
limited when courts evaluate Title IX compliance under the 
“substantial proportionality” standard.236 Nonetheless, despite 
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finding that roster manipulation237 did not occur during the 
2009-2010 school year, the court engaged in a detailed analysis 
of “whether Quinnipiac’s mandatory roster numbers are 
appropriately set and afford athletes genuine varsity 
participation opportunities.”238 After comparing the sizes of 
Quinnipiac’s athletic team rosters with both the conference and 
national averages, the court concluded that with some 
exceptions, Quinnipiac appeared to set its men’s team rosters 
relatively small and its women’s team rosters relatively large, 
although the differences were not dramatic.239 
The Biediger court took a middle-of-the-road approach 
in addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that the university’s 
roster management policies resulted in too few genuine athletic 
participation opportunities for women. Specifically, in light of 
the finding that the university clearly “set its roster targets 
with the intent of producing statistics showing that it provides 
substantially proportional athletic participation opportunities 
for women,” the court noted that this was “not necessarily 
wrong.”240 Therefore, on its own, the evidence with respect to 
the university’s roster management policies did not entitle the 
plaintiffs to relief.241 Nonetheless, the court noted that this 
evidence served two other purposes.242 First, it strengthened the 
plaintiffs’ other argument that the university was improperly 
counting female cross-country runners multiple times for their 
required participation on the indoor and outdoor track teams.243 
Further, it indicated to the court “that the University’s roster 
targets were carefully chosen and managed, and any shortfall 
in the number of Quinnipiac’s female athletes is attributable to 
University decision-making and not other external factors.”244 
Therefore, the court upheld the use of roster management 
policies, including setting roster ceilings and floors, as a valid 
means of achieving Title IX compliance.245 In doing so, however, 
it seemed to suggest that a university employing a roster 
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management system similar to that of Quinnipiac may be 
subject to enhanced scrutiny in evaluating Title IX compliance. 
It remains to be seen how other courts will address challenges 
to roster management policies under Title IX. 
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